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Abstract: Philosophers sometimes give arguments that presuppose the follow-
ing principle: two theories can fail to be empirically equivalent on the sole
basis that they present different “thick” metaphysical pictures of the world.
Recently, a version of this principle has been invoked to respond to the ar-
gument that composite objects are dispensable to our best scientific theories.
This response claims that our empirical evidence distinguishes between ordi-
nary and composite-free theories, and it empirically favors the ordinary ones
(Hofweber, 2016, 2018). In this paper, I ask whether this response to the dis-
pensability argument is tenable. I claim that it is not. This is because it pre-
supposes an indefensible thesis about when two empirical consequences are
distinct or the same. My argument provides some insight into what our em-
pirical consequences are, and I conclude that empirical evidence is radically
metaphysically neutral. This gives us some insight into the significant content
of our scientific theories—the content that a scientific realist is committed to—
and I show how this insight relates to questions about theoretical equivalence
more broadly.
1 INTRODUCTION
In Lorentz’s ether theory, ether was postulated as a substance that acted as the
medium for the transmission of light through space. Philosophers of science
tell the following story for why physicists no longer accept the existence of
ether (see, e.g., Norton (2003)).
Lorentz’s ether theory had many predictions and observations, in-
cluding length contraction, which is the phenomenon that a mov-
ing object’s measured length will be shorter than its proper length.
Einstein proposed an alternative theory, special relativity, that has
the exact same predictions and observations (Bradley, 2020, 9), in-
cluding length contraction, without needing to posit the existence
of ether. Special relativity thus showed physicists that ether is dis-
pensable.1
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1It is common for philosophers of science to tell a similar story for why physicists no longer
believe in absolute space. See Friedman (1983, p. 112). Additionally, absolute space and ether are
taken to play roughly the same role in Lorentz’s ether theory—as providing a privileged inertial
frame.
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Einstein showed that ether is dispensable to theories of light by providing
an attractive alternative theory which (i) does not appeal to ether and (ii) is
empirically equivalent to Lorentz’s. Physicists took the dispensability of ether
as good reason to abandon ontological commitment to it. Today, philosophers
of science and metaphysicians operate on the same understanding of dispens-
ability. Some claim that numbers are indispensable to scientific theories by
arguing that one cannot provide nominalistic alternatives that meet these two
conditions (cf. Colyvan (2001) and Field (2016)). Philosophers generally take
the dispensability of an entity to have ontological consequences; if an entity is
dispensable, we should abandon ontological commitment to it.
One argument within the metaphysics of ordinary objects is best under-
stood as a dispensability argument. This Composite Object Dispensability Ar-
gument (CODA) concludes that ordinary composite objects like metal bars are
dispensable to our best scientific theories (cf. Rosen and Dorr (2002), Sider
(2013), and Brenner (2018, 660)). The idea is that the only things needed to ex-
plain phenomena like conduction are the microphysical particles that “make
up” the metal bar. The CODA offers a strategy for constructing a variant of
any scientific theory, and these variants supposedly meet the criteria for dis-
pensing with composites. They are meant to be attractive theories that (i) do
not appeal to composites and (ii) are empirically equivalent to the ordinary
theories that do appeal to composite objects. Proponents of this dispensability
argument take themselves to have shown that composites are dispensable to
any scientific theory which they appear, and this is meant to be evidence that
there are no composite objects like metal bars.
Here I am concerned with empirical equivalence and its relation to the
CODA. Two theories are empirically equivalent in virtue of sharing the same
empirical evidence or content, which is understood as having the same empir-
ical consequences.2 According to the CODA, the composite-free theories have
the same empirical consequences as the ordinary theories that appeal to com-
posites; our empirical evidence is neutral between them. For example, an ordi-
nary theory might have the empirical consequence that there is a metal bar in
the lab. A composite-free alternative would have the empirical consequence,
roughly, that some microphysical particles “arranged metal bar-wise” are in
some particular place. These two empirical consequences are taken to be the
same.
Some, though, disagree with the CODA’s claim of empirical equivalence.
For example, Hofweber claims that composite-free theories are trivially empir-
ically inequivalent to their ordinary counterparts. He says,
2Here we are presupposing some rough distinction between the empirical and non-empirical.
Such a presupposition raises questions and concerns about the theory-ladenness of observation
(see Fodor (1984)). There are difficult questions about any particular distinction between the em-
pirical or non-empirical, and whether consequences like There is an electron in the bubble chamber
are empirical. Here, we work with an intuitive distinction between theory and observation, and
we rest easy knowing there are difficult boundary cases. Unlike the logical positivists, we are
not drawing the boundary between meaningfulness and nonsense, and so the question of whether
some particular consequence is empirical or not is less pressing than it was for them. See Lewis
(1988, 4) for a similar motivation.
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There is lots of evidence that supports the [composite] object the-
ory over the things arranged object-wise theory. The object theory
predicts that there is a bar of metal in the lab, the object-wise the-
ory doesn’t predict it. That there is such a bar can be confirmed
with the observation that there is such a bar of metal in the lab.
(Hofweber, 2016, 199)
Hofweber is claiming that the empirical evidence for our scientific theories—
the observations and predictions—is “clearly in favour of [the existence of
composite] objects” (Hofweber, 2018, 321-322). The claim is not merely that
we have more or better scientific reasons to prefer ordinary theories, but rather
that we have better empirical reasons to prefer ordinary theories. He is clear
that “[empirical] scientific evidence does in fact distinguish” between composite-
free and ordinary theories, and it favors the ordinary ones (ibid.). Hofweber
here presupposes a thesis about the individuation conditions of empirical con-
sequences. In particular, he is committed to the thesis that differences in the
“thick” mereological content between two empirical consequences suffices for
a difference between those empirical consequences. As a result, if two theories’
empirical consequences differ in their “thick” mereological content, then they
are empirically inequivalent. Otherwise it could not be that our empirical ev-
idence supports the ordinary theory over the composite-free one. In this way,
Hofweber is committed to the empirical significance of “thick” mereological
content; he is presupposing that “thick” content matters to the scientific the-
ory. Accordingly, the empirical consequences of a composite-free theory are
trivially inequivalent to the empirical consequences of our ordinary theories.
Call this the trivial response to the CODA.
At this point, the dialectic is brought to a halt. The CODA claims that
composite-free theories are clearly empirically equivalent to their ordinary
counterparts. The trivial response claims that composite-free theories are triv-
ially empirically inequivalent to their ordinary counterparts. Without some
clear understanding of the individuation conditions for empirical consequences,
we cannot adjudicate this disagreement.
My topic is the individuation conditions of empirical consequences. My
proximate aim is to settle whether the trivial response to the CODA is tenable.
As we will see, my ultimate target is anyone who claims that “thick” makes
an empirical difference. I will argue that there is no good conception of em-
pirical consequences that will permit the trivial response to the CODA. My
argument proceeds by considering successful cases of dispensing, like when
we rid our physics of ether. My thesis supports the position I call empirical
quietism, which entails that we cannot settle any distinctively metaphysical
disputes by appealing to empirical evidence. Although quietism may seem ob-
vious to some, there are two additional philosophical payoffs that the following
discussion yields.
First, because empirical equivalence plays a prominent role in many onto-
logical arguments, it is imperative that we understand the conditions under
which two theories are empirically equivalent. For any pair of empirically
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equivalent theories, there are at least pressing three ontological questions.
First is the underdetermination question, which asks whether we should be
committed to either theory’s ontology; it seems that the existence of an empir-
ically equivalent alternative should threaten to undermine our confidence in
the theory we accept (cf. van Fraassen (1980), Laudan (1990), Stanford (2009),
and Worrall (2011)). Second is the theoretical equivalence question, which
asks whether the two theories are fully equivalent; it may be that two theo-
ries seem to have different ontological commitments, but that this is a merely
apparent difference (cf. North (2009), Curiel (2014) Barrett (2015), Barrett
(2019), Barrett (2020), and Weatherall (2019a)). Third is the dispensability
question, which asks whether we have reasons to prefer one theory’s ontol-
ogy to another; it may be that we have reasons similar to parsimony to accept
one of two empirically equivalent theories. For philosophers of science and
metaphysicians, determining exactly when two theories have the same empir-
ical consequences is important for the role that empirical equivalence plays
in these arguments, and my conclusion will entail that some conceptions of
empirical equivalence—ones antagonistic to quietism—should be rejected.
Second, my discussion will allow us to draw broader lessons on theoreti-
cal equivalence. The literature on theoretical equivalence is concerned with
the conditions under which theories are fully equivalent, in the sense of say-
ing the same thing about the world. Some people in that literature endorse
a position adjacent to Hofweber’s. Whereas Hofweber argues that an empiri-
cal consequence’s “thick” content is relevant for individuation, these folks ar-
gue that a non-empirical consequence’s “thick” content is likewise relevant for
individuation. For example, North (2009) argues from ostensible differences
in the structure of two formulations of classical mechanics—a difference in
“thick” content—to the inequivalence of those formulations. If my arguments
against those who ascribe empirical significance to “thick” content are correct,
we should tread lightly. If we will have learned anything, it is that two theories
having the same or different consequences is a complicated matter, not to be
decided by only considering metaphysically rich content.
2 PRELIMINARIES
The trivial response claims that composite-free theories are trivially empiri-
cally inequivalent to ordinary scientific theories, and it rejects the CODA on
those grounds. We begin by investigating exactly what the trivial objection is
committed to. The CODA, as an argument in its own right, is rarely discussed
in the literature. It is usually implied by the claim that appeal to ordinary ob-
jects is “pragmatic” (cf. Healey (2013, 53), Brenner (2018, 660)3). I hope the
following explanation of the CODA shows that there is philosophical value in
pursuing it explicitly.
3Healey (2013) does not explicitly endorse the conclusion of the CODA—that we ought to reject
the existence of composite objects—but he does accept that what scientists regard as composed is
partially determined by the context in which the scientist is operating.
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2.1 The CODA
Dispensability arguments are given by those who draw ontological commit-
ments from an entity’s dispensability. Consider the following dispensability
principle: If some entity is dispensable to our best scientific theories, then we
ought not be committed to its existence. Scientific realists may be inclined to
accept the dispensability principle if they believe that science is the best guide
to answering ontological questions. This dispensability principle seems to be
what drove physicists to abandon commitment to ether.
To show that an entity is dispensable to some scientific theory, we must
provide an alternative theory that dispenses with that entity. A dispensing
theory is one that fits the following account, adapted from Colyvan (2001, 77):
Dispensability. An entity (or structure) X is dispensable to a theory T if and
only if T has an attractive variant T − for which:
(i) T − does not appeal to Xs, and
(ii) T − has the same empirical consequences as T .
If there’s a theory that appeals to some entity (or structure4) we suspect to
be dispensable, to show its dispensability we provide an attractive theory that
does not appeal to the entity (or structure) and has the same empirical con-
sequences as the original. (i) requires that the variant does not appeal to the
dispensable entity; if it does, we haven’t shown that the entity is unnecessary.
(ii) requires that the variant has the same empirical consequences; if it doesn’t,
then that suggests that the entity does play an explanatory role.5 These con-
ditions are each necessary and jointly sufficient for showing an entity to be
dispensable.
Empirical consequences, intuitively, are the observations and predictions
of a theory. Theories make observations and predictions about the world; they
tell us what it is like and what it will be like. Sameness of empirical conse-
quences, or empirical equivalence, occurs when two theories make the same
observations and proffer the same predictions about the world. For the time,
we will operate on this intuitive notion of empirical consequences and empir-
ical equivalence.
The CODA argues that all composite objects are dispensable to our best sci-
entific theories. One might be sympathetic to the CODA because they consider
appeal to composite objects to be merely pragmatic. Composites like iron bars
may just be heuristics, allowing us to better understand complex scientific ex-
planations but not serving a genuinely explanatory role in those explanations
4Cf. (North, 2009, 64) and Barrett (2020, 2 - 3).
5What if T − explained more than T did? Does the definition entail that T ′ does not dispense
with the entity in question? Per the definition provided, it seems that the entity is not dispensable.
Some may find this problematic, since it seems like we ought to prefer T − to T . But note that we
have reasons beyond the dispensability of the entity to prefer T −—it explains more! So we have
ordinary, empirical reasons to prefer T −, rather than a priori reasons of dispensability.
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(Brenner (2018, 660)).6 Instead, the complex physical phenomena are fully ex-
plained by partless microphysical entities and processes.7 If this is persuasive,
then it seems that ordinary scientific theories need not appeal to composite
objects, since all we need to explain everything is microphysical. In accor-
dance with the standard account of dispensability, the CODA provides variants
for each scientific theory that appeals to composites. Instead of meticulously
constructing these variants, the CODA offers a strategy to construct, for every
ordinary scientific theory that appeals to composite objects, a composite-free
variant that has the same empirical consequences. That strategy, which may be
familiar, works like this.8
Consider the theory of rust R: rust, a reddish-brown substance that is the
result of corrosion, is an iron oxide that forms on iron in the presence of oxygen
together with water or air moisture. The iron is a reducing agent, giving up
electrons, while the oxygen is an oxidizing agent, gaining electrons, resulting
in iron oxide—rust. As an ordinary scientific theory, R appeals to composite
objects; rust is an iron oxide that forms on iron in the presence of oxygen and
water.
The CODA presents a strategy for constructing a variant of R that does not
appeal to composites and has its same empirical consequences. Let’s simplify
and consider only one empirical consequence and try to rid R of just one com-
posite object. Take the following observation delivered by the theory when
some particular iron bar rusted after being exposed to moisture-rich air.
(b) This iron bar rusted.
(b) is an empirical consequence that appeals to a composite: this iron bar.
Proponents of the CODA think all genuine explanatory work is done by the
partless microphysical particles that make up the “iron bar.” If they are cor-
rect, then to reveal the actual explanatory structure of our theories, we ought to
replace all appeal to iron bars in R with appeal to only the partless, microphys-
ical mereological simples and the complex ways in which they are arranged to
be iron bar-wise.9 (We must also replace appeal to properties that are realized
by composite objects with collective properties that are realized by arrange-
ments. Though it is much more complicated than this, I will simply refer to
the collective property variant of any ordinary property by appending it with
the prime symbol. This way rusting becomes rusting′ , where rusting′ is realized
by simples in arrangements.) This is how to construct a variant of R where
appeal to iron bars is replaced with appeal to simples (and appeal to rusting
is replaced with appeal to rusting′). Call this new theory R−, which has the
following empirical consequence:
6Cf. Osborne (2016).
7A similar motivation is found in Sider (2007), where he argues that a composite object does
not afford a thing with any causal powers beyond those had by the parts of that thing.
8Here I follow Dorr (2002) and Rosen and Dorr (2002).
9The ‘arranged X-wise’ locution is from Inwagen (1990). Here I assume both that the composite
objects that science appeals to are not extended simples (Cf. McDaniel (2007)) and that the world
is not gunky (Cf. Sider (1993)).
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(b−) These simples arranged iron bar-wise rusted′ .
The CODA claims that R− is empirically equivalent to R and that (b) is the
same empirical consequence as (b−). The idea is this: When we observe what we’d
ordinarily describe as an iron bar rusting, the two theories can equally suffi-
ciently explain it. R will explain that the iron bar went through the process
of rusting, and R− will explain that the simples arranged iron bar-wise col-
lectively went through the process of rusting′ . Sure, the iron bar-free variant
will be more difficult to comprehend, since it appeals to philosophical entities
like simples and is cognitively cumbersome, but this is not a mark against its
empirical adequacy.
Though the CODA claims that (b) and (b−) are the same empirical conse-
quence, we note that they have different “thick” metaphysical content. This
notion of thick metaphysical content is to be understood as a consequence’s as-
sociated underlying metaphysical picture. (b) is associated with an underlying
metaphysical picture where there are composites, and (b−) is associated with
one where there are no composites. According to the CODA, the mere fact that
(b) and (b−) have different thick metaphysical content is not sufficient for them
being distinct empirical consequences. As we’ll see, Hofweber demurs.
R− purportedly meets the conditions for showing iron bars to be dispens-
able. First, R− does not appeal to iron bars. Second, if the CODA’s reasoning is
correct, R− is empirically equivalent to R. Given these facts about R− together
with the conditions for showing an entity to be dispensable, we have shown
that iron bars are dispensable to theories of rust.10 Accordingly, the CODA
concludes that we ought to reject the existence of iron bars. This is the general
strategy for dispensing with composite objects that appear in different theo-
ries, which the CODA takes to show that all composite objects in all scientific
theories are dispensable.
2.2 The Empirical Significance of Thick Content
Hofweber straightforwardly asserts that our empirical evidence decides in fa-
vor of the existence of composite objects. The idea seems to be that our theo-
ries’ empirical consequences come “pre-loaded” with a particular mereological
picture and that this mereological picture, which presents the world as con-
taining composite objects, is representationally significant. In brief, Hofweber
is committed to the thesis that thick mereological content is empirically signif-
icant.
10Some suggest that providing a dispensing theory also requires that the variant one provides
is more attractive than the original theory. Colyvan (2001) and Field (2016) make these claims.
If one accepts this, one might be tempted to reject the CODA on the grounds that the composite-
free variant is not sufficiently attractive to show that composite objects are dispensable. There
are rumblings of this response in the objects literature already. For example, Parsons (2013, 332)
denies composite-free scientific theories because “composite objects play a crucial role in the best
explanations of my experience.” I take this to mean that showing an entity to be dispensable re-
quires offering an entity-free theory that best (or better) explains the phenomena, and not offering
an entity-free theory that simply explains the phenomena.
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There are philosophers who are committed to similar theses. They presup-
pose or otherwise argue that some other thick metaphysical content is empiri-
cally significant. It would behoove us to see a few of these other arguments in
metaphysics. Here’s a test for whether a philosopher is committed to the thesis
that some thick content is empirically significant: if someone claims that a the-
ory’s evidence is incompatible with one but not all sides of some distinctively
metaphysical debate, then they believe that the metaphysical content of that
debate, when it appears in theories, is empirically significant. If one was an
evidential quietist, who does not think that thick content is empirically signif-
icant, they would deny that a theory’s evidence could be compatible with one
but not all sides of a distinctively metaphysical debate. Note that adherence to
the empirical significance of some thick content (e.g., mereological) does not
entail that one adheres to the empirical significance of any other thick content
(e.g., identity). Here are three instances of philosophers who are committed to
the empirical significance of thick metaphysical content.
First, in the literature on personal identity, Blatti (2012) argues from evo-
lutionary theory to the thesis that human persons are identical to organisms.
His idea is that any non-organism metaphysical position will be inconsistent
with the empirical consequence of evolutionary biology that my ancestor is an
organism. Blatti here straightforwardly presupposes that a theory’s thick con-
tent regarding identity is empirically significant; our empirical evidence for the
theory of evolution apparently settles the debate over personal identity. Sec-
ond, Williamson (2007, 223) argues that scientific theories that are composite-
free will not be supported by the same evidence that our current theories are;
this is because the evidence for our current theories is committed to the exis-
tence of composite objects.11 E.g., the evidence for R consists of claims like
the hygrometer measured such-and-such humidity levels, which appeals to a
composite object. Williamson is committed to the empirical significance of
mereological content in a manner weaker than Hofweber’s. He is presuppos-
ing that there is a prima facie evidential problem for composite-free scientific
theories, whereas Hofweber argues that there is an open-and-shut evidential
problem for composite-free theories. Finally, Lowe (2003, 2005) gives an ar-
gument against composite-free theories, where one interpretation of this ar-
gument is that such theories which do not appeal to properties like mass and
momentum trivially cannot explain what ordinary physics theories explain be-
cause they do not appeal to the exact properties of mass and momentum as
such. For Lowe, the structure of mass and momentum as such are empirically
significant.
In each of these examples, it is natural to think that philosophers are com-
mitted to the empirical significance of some thick metaphysical content. They
are giving arguments which proceed from considerations of empirical evidence
to some conclusion about purely metaphysical matters.12
11Cf. Bagwell (2020).
12See Bailey and Brenner (2020) for additional, similar examples.
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2.3 The Trivial Response
Let’s return to the trivial response. Hofweber claims that our empirical evi-
dence favors the existence of composite objects. Here we will examine how
this claim entails a rejection of the CODA and unravel its commitments.
We focus on the claim of the CODA that ordinary and composite-free theo-
ries are empirically equivalent. The trivial response reasons as follows. Among
the empirical consequences of R is that this iron bar rusted, whereas R− has no
such empirical consequence. R− has the empirical consequence (b−):
(b−) These simples arranged iron bar-wise rusted′ .
But this is not the same empirical consequence, according to the trivial re-
sponse. Even if we can construct a composite-free variant in the way provided
above, and bypass any other objections, Hofweber thinks the predictions and
observations of the two theories are trivially different. This is because he claims
that our empirical evidence favors a particular mereological picture. If our em-
pirical evidence supports the existence of composite objects, then trivially any
empirical evidence that does not support the existence of composite objects
is not the same empirical evidence. For if our observations confirm (b) but not
(b−), then (b) and (b−) are distinct empirical consequences. The trivial response
thus rejects the claims of the CODA that R and R− are empirically equivalent.
It is trivially impossible to provide an empirically equivalent, but composite-
free, alternative to any ordinary scientific theory, says the trivial response.
Hofweber’s trivial response requires a particular thesis about the individ-
uation conditions of empirical consequences (as does any other variety of the
empirical significance thesis like those outlined in §2.2). The trivial response
succeeds only if we can empirically distinguish between R and R−, and pre-
supposes a position on how finely empirical consequences are individuated.
In particular, the only difference Hofweber points to as a distinguishing fea-
ture between (b) and (b−) is the thick metaphysical content—the underlying
mereological picture associated with each empirical consequence.
Let us formally define this thesis on empirical consequence individuation.
For any theories TA and TB, where TA has the empirical consequences (a1), (a2),
. . . and TB has the empirical consequences (b1), (b2), . . . , the trivial response is
committed to the following:
Fine Grained If the underlying mereological picture associated with (a1), (a2),
. . . is different from the underlying mereological picture associated with
(b1), (b2), . . . , then TA and TB are not empirically equivalent.
Fine Grained entails that empirical consequences may be individuated by
the particular mereological pictures associated with those empirical conse-
quences; in this sense, it is a fine-grained understanding of the individuation
conditions of empirical consequences. (b) paints a picture where there is a
composite object, an iron bar, that behaved in a certain manner; it rusted. (b−)
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is not associated such a picture; instead, is is only associated with there be-
ing simples in arrangements that rusted′ . Because these two empirical con-
sequences are associated with different mereological pictures—i.e., they have
different thick mereological content—it follows from Fine Grained that they
are not the same empirical consequence. Thus the trivialist can give a simple
argument for the empirical inequivalence of R and R−.
If Fine Grained is correct, then the CODA is trivially unsound. The obser-
vations and predictions of ordinary scientific theories are about, and thereby
appeal to, composites like planets, iron bars, and organisms. These empirical
consequences present a particular mereological picture—one where there are
planets, iron bars, and organisms. And were we to construct theories with em-
pirical consequences associated with different mereological pictures—no plan-
ets, iron bars, nor organisms as such—then Fine Grained entails that these em-
pirical consequences are necessarily distinct from those of ordinary scientific
theories. Because the CODA attempts to achieve precisely this, the claim that
composite-free theories are empirically equivalent to ordinary scientific theo-
ries is trivially false if Fine Grained is true.
3 REJECTING FINE GRAINED
The trivial response claims that composite-free theories are trivially empiri-
cally inequivalent to their ordinary counterparts. This is because it presup-
poses Fine Grained, and Fine Grained entails such empirical inequivalence. To
me, Fine Grained is neither obviously true nor obviously false. To adjudicate
the dispute about empirical equivalence, we must look into theories of empir-
ical consequences that would vindicate Fine Grained. If we find that there is
no good, obvious way to vindicate Fine Grained, then we can tentatively re-
ject the trivial response to the CODA. I argue that we find this and more: any
candidate theory of empirical consequences will not vindicate Fine Grained.
Accordingly, we ought to reject the trivialist response to the CODA.
In this section, I will propose and reject two theories of the individuation
conditions of empirical consequences that entail Fine Grained. Because we
are determining standards of empirical equivalence, we cannot rely upon in-
tuitions of empirical equivalence. Otherwise we are at the stalemate indicated
at the outset. Instead, I rely on the possibility of successful dispensing, and I
argue that from these cases of dispensing we can infer facts about empirical
equivalence. This is because a dispensing theory, per the standard account of
dispensability, must be empirically equivalent with the original theory. The
basic idea of my argument is that Fine Grained precludes the possibility of
dispensing with entities that might be dispensable.
3.1 Semantic Individuation
The most straightforward way to vindicate Fine Grained is a theory of empiri-
cal consequences where they are individuated according to their semantic con-
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tent. Though many would find this independently implausible, it is instructive
to see why it fails. Here is Semantic Individuation:
Semantic Individuation Empirical consequences (c1) and (c2) are the same
empirical consequence if and only if the expressions of (c1) and (c2) have
the same semantic content.
With Semantic Individuation, we have a test for whether two empirical con-
sequences are the same—and, accordingly, a test for whether two theories have
the same empirical consequences. Namely, whether their expressions are syn-
onymous.
We can show how Semantic Individuation will entail Fine Grained. Recall R
and R− and the expressions of their empirical consequences in (b) and (b−). Un-
der any usual standard of synonymy, (b) and (b−) are not synonymous. Given
Semantic Individuation, (b) and (b−) are not the same empirical consequences.
Moreover, there are no empirical consequences of R− that are synonymous with
(b), since R− is explicitly formulated in terms that are not synonymous with
composite-terms. Accordingly, R and R− are empirically inequivalent. More
generally, semantic content itself is finely discriminating, and so individuation
according to semantic content will be finely discriminating too. This is how
Semantic Individuation entails Fine Grained.
But we have reason to think that Semantic Individuation is independently
problematic: it entails the trivial impossibility of dispensing with entities that
are intuitively dispensable.
Consider an alternate history of astronomy. As we currently think of them,
constellations are apparent groupings of stars seen only according to the Earth’s
relative position to them. For the astronomer, there aren’t constellations; there
are only stars. But suppose that modern astronomers, after they fully under-
stood that stars are Sun-like entities that are often light-years away from each
other, nonetheless still thought that stars sometimes formed a constellation.
And suppose they still believed in the independent existence of constellations
for no good reason—just a superstitious holdover from antiquity. Semantic In-
dividuation entails that we could not show that constellations are dispensable.
This is because Semantic Individuation bars the possibility that constellation-
free theories could have the same empirical consequences.
For consider what a dispensability argument would look like. First, we
would take the current alternate theory of astronomy C that has the following
empirical consequence, referring to a particular constellation (together with
some background conditions):
(c) This constellation is visible in August.
Suppose someone thought that constellations are dispensable to our theo-
ries. This constellation dispenser might suggest that we adopt the constellation-
free theory C− that has a different empirical consequence.
(c−) These stars are visible in August
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C− seems to dispense with constellations. We can explain everything we
want in astronomy without appealing to constellations if we accept C− in-
stead of C. But if Semantic Individuation is true, then because (c) and (c−) are
not synonymous—and because there is no constellation-free empirical conse-
quence that is synonymous with (c)—the constellation-free theory is empiri-
cally inequivalent to the alternate astronomy theory.
This is a problem for Semantic Individuation. Constellations are dispens-
able to C. And they’re dispensable in the usual way, where we conduct an a
priori investigation into what parts of a theory are necessary to explain what the
theory explains, and we realize that constellations are just a vestigial aspect of
C. So, constellations are dispensable to C, and we can provide a constellation-
free theory C−, but Semantic Individuation entails that the C− is trivially em-
pirically inequivalent to C. Thus, because empirical equivalence is a necessary
condition for a dispensing theory, and because we have a dispensing theory,
there is a counterexample to Semantic Individuation and we ought to reject it.
It seems as though Semantic Individuation is too fine-grained. Note here
that we are not consulting our intuitions about whether (c) and (c−) are the
same empirical consequence. The argument is more general than that. The
argument is that Semantic Individuation entails that no entity is dispensable
if that entity appears in our empirical consequences. For to dispense with that
entity, we must provide an alternative that has synonymous empirical conse-
quences. And if the empirical consequences are synonymous then we haven’t
dispensed with the entity. C is just an illustrative instance of the restrictions
that Semantic Individuation places on which entities are possibly dispensable.
Semantic Individuation implausibly entails that no entity which appears in
our empirical consequences is dispensable. Accordingly, we should reject it
for placing overly restrictive boundaries on the kinds of entities that can be
dispensed with.13
3.2 Representational Individuation
One might naturally think that empirical consequences are individuated ac-
cording to their representational contents. Scientists approach the external
world through their perceptual capabilities, and it is reasonable to think that
the empirical consequences of scientific theories are (at least informed by) the
deliverances of our perceptual systems; call these representational contents.
Representational contents are data about the world that are present to an or-
ganism. When the representational contents of two empirical consequences
are different, that seems to be the mark of individuation we are seeking.
Here we explore such a theory of the individuation conditions of empirical
consequences, which I will call Thick Representational Individuation (TRI).
The basic idea is that, with the addition of some theses about humans’ repre-
sentational contents, there are ways to distinguish between the empirical con-
sequences of ordinary scientific theories and their object-free variants because
13Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me clarify the import of this argument.
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of the differences in representational content. In §3.4, I argue that TRI fails
because of its adherence to one of the additional theses about the representa-
tional contents of humans.
One small caveat about my approach. A representational theory of indi-
viduation claims that empirical consequences are individuated according to
the representational contents of those empirical consequences. This articula-
tion leaves open the question of how representational contents are related to
empirical consequences. It is unspecified whether empirical consequences are
constituted by representational contents, or partially constituted by representa-
tional contents, or simply informed by representational contents. It is consis-
tent with the present theory that there is more to empirical consequences than
representational contents. The only commitment is that differences in repre-
sentational contents is sufficient for differences in empirical consequences. I
will refer to an empirical consequence’s representational contents as a stand-in for
whatever particular relationship one wishes to commit to.
Many philosophers have argued that the representational contents of per-
ception, when that perception is veridical, bears a non-representational or ex-
ternal relationship to the thing being represented.14 Call this thesis External:
External All veridical representational contents bear external, non-representational
relationships to what is being represented.
The idea here is that in order to account for a variety of phenomena re-
garding perception, it must be that veridical representations bear non-purely-
representational relations to the things being represented. (Hereafter, I will
drop the word ‘veridically’, and unless otherwise specified, representational
contents are veridical.) There must always be some external or worldly re-
lation between representation and represented. Exactly what relation is dis-
puted. Some think that the representational content of a perception of some
tree is constituted, in part, by the tree (e.g., Fish (2009), Johnston (2004)); oth-
ers think that this same content is causally explained by the tree (e.g., Burge
(2010)), perhaps together with the evolutionary conditions of the perceiving
creature. External is similar to externalist theories of semantic content, where
cases of successful reference require a non-semantic relation between the re-
ferring term and the thing referenced. (Consider here Kripke’s famous causal
theory of reference (Kripke, 1981).)
The first step of a Representational Individuation theory is thus an adher-
ence to the thesis of External. The idea is that the empirical consequences of
a scientific theory bear a non-representational relation to the world—that, for
example, the actual iron bar in (b) explains, in some way, the representational
content of (b). Here, then, is a first pass at a Representational Individuation
theory:
Representational Individuation Empirical consequences (c1) and (c2) are the
same empirical consequence if and only if the representational contents
14This conception of the contents of perception includes any externalist theory. See, e.g., Dretske
(1997) and Stalnaker (2003).
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of (c1) and (c2) are the same, where representational contents are Exter-
nal.
When empirical consequences differ, this is sometimes explainable by dif-
ferences in the way the world is. That this particular bar of metal rusted in the
presence of moisture-rich air partially explains the empirical consequence (b).
Consider the empirical consequence (¬b).
(¬b) This iron bar did not rust.
On this understanding of empirical consequences, (¬b) is distinguishable
from (b) because the representational contents of (¬b) and of (b) are distinct.
We can, for example, perceive whether or not the iron bar rusted. Moreover, we
can chalk this difference in representational contents up to a difference in the
way the world actually is—in one case, the bar of metal rusts, and in the other,
it fails to rust.
The claim that representational contents are External is an elegant and
powerful understanding of empirical consequences, and one which, I will sug-
gest, might vindicate Hofweber’s trivial response.
3.3 Thick Representational Individuation (TRI)
Representational Individuation as presented is not enough to entail Fine Grained.
In particular, it is unclear whether the representational contents of perception
are robust enough to distinguish between an iron bar and simples arranged iron
bar-wise. Here, we examine a thesis that, when paired with Representational
Individuation, will entail Fine Grained. This thesis is Thick:
Thick Representational contents present an underlying mereological picture
of what is being represented.15
According to Thick, our representational contents are mereologically de-
tailed. It claims that representational contents present a mereological picture
of the thing represented. The idea here is that we can distinguish between
representational contents where the only difference between two contents is a
difference in their mereological pictures. This is because, per Thick, our repre-
sentational contents actually present these two as having distinct metaphysical
pictures. If Thick is true, we will only veridically perceive something as a com-
posite object if it is a composite object. And when presented with a genuine
composite object, so long as there are no perceptual errors, we will perceive it
as a composite object. Our perceptual capacities have bequeathed us with the
ability to not be fooled into representing simples arranged object-wise as an
object, nor representing a composite object as simples arranged object-wise (so
15Thick should strictly be read as follows: All (or all relevant) empirically-relevant representa-
tional contents present an underlying mereological picture of what is being represented. We will
leave Thick quantifier-less in the main body because this precise articulation adds complications
about what Hofweber is committed to.
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long as there are no errors). We can perceptually distinguish between the two.
Byrne (2019), for example, holds this view.
Some may find Thick evolutionarily implausible—it seems like there is no
evolutionary reason for an organism’s perceptual capacities to be able to dis-
tinguish between simples in arrangements and composites. Others simply
disagree with Thick, and claim that our representational content “would be
the same whether or not the atoms arranged . . . [object]-wise composed some-
thing” (Merricks, 2001, 9).16 But for the sake of argument, we will for now
grant Thick alongside External.
These two features of empirical consequences and representational con-
tents yield the following individuation conditions for empirical consequences:
Thick Representational Individuation Empirical consequences (c1) and (c2)
are the same empirical consequence if and only if the representational
content of (c1) and (c2) are the same, where representational contents are
Thick and External.
TRI says that two empirical consequences are distinct when they have dis-
tinct representational contents, where representational contents are External
and Thick. In short, the idea here is that representational contents are quite
representationally dense—not only are we presented with some coarse-grained
information about the world, but also with an underlying mereological picture.
Thick content, in other words, is part of the total representational content of
an empirical consequence.
TRI entails Fine Grained straightforwardly. If TRI is true, then empirical
consequences are individuated according to their representational contents.
According to Thick, representational contents present an underlying mereo-
logical picture of what is being represented. If this is so, then empirical conse-
quences are finely mereologically individuating. Our empirical consequences
can distinguish between those cases where the only difference is the mereo-
logical facts. Here we finally have a theory of individuation conditions that
vindicates Fine Grained.
Here is how a trivialist would use TRI to argue against the CODA. The
representational content of (b) is that some iron bar behaved in a certain way.
This representational content presents a thick metaphysical picture where the
iron bar is represented as an iron bar (and not simply simples arranged iron
bar-wise). The representational content of (b−), on the other hand, is that some
simples arranged iron bar-wise behaved in a certain way. Thus, if Thick is true,
we can perceptually distinguish between the empirical consequences of R and
those of R−. Per TRI, because we can perceptually distinguish between (b) and
(b−), they are not the same empirical consequence. Consequently, R and R−
are trivially empirically inequivalent. It is a consequence of the theory of TRI
that the CODA is unsound, independent of any of the other problems with the
dispensability argument. Note that Thick is the crucial premise here; in order
16See also Korman (2014, 4) and Thomasson (2014, 16, 157).
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to vindicate the trivial response, it must be that our representational contents
present a mereological picture.
3.4 Against Thick Representational Individuation
Again, we will reject TRI because it precludes the possibility of dispensing with
entities that might be dispensable. We begin the counterexample with a fact
about humans. We perceive faces as faces—we do not judge an array of features
to be a face, but instead perceive it that way.17 In this way, humans actually
have Thick representational contents when faces are involved; we recognize
not only arrangements of facial features, but a face. This is, at least to some
extent, a biological capacity, but there is some debate over the extent to which
it is learned.18
It is a rather mundane mereological picture that is presented when we rep-
resent something as a face rather than as arrangements of facial features, but
it is a mereological picture nevertheless. Moreover, here we are granting to the
trivial response that there are cases where we perceptually distinguish things
according to their underlying mereological picture.
We continue with another alternate history of astronomy. Suppose that in
the night sky in August, there were some stars that looked exactly like a hu-
man woman’s face—call this Phoebe’s Face. When scientists look into the night
sky, they seem to perceive Phoebe’s face in the arrangement of stars. Their rep-
resentational contents are actually as of Phoebe’s Face, not merely some stars
arranged face-wise. The perceptual evidence is so convincing, and the image
so detailed, that everyone in this alternative history genuinely believes that
Phoebe’s Face exists. The theories of astronomy (together with background
conditions) might well contain the following empirical consequence.
(p) Phoebe’s Face is visible in August.
(p) is an empirical consequence of this alternate theory of astronomy P .
And if TRI is correct, then (p) is committed to Phoebe’s Face being a face, much
like how (b) commits to that iron bar being a composed iron bar.
Suppose, though, that a scientist was conducting a priori investigations into
whether there are any parts of our theories that are dispensable, and they nom-
inate Phoebe’s Face. After all, they think, we know that humans have a procliv-
ity for seeing things as faces, and sometimes it is hyperactive. Maybe, then, our
perceptions of Phoebe’s Face are illusory in a sense. It seems that Phoebe’s Face
is dispensable to P ; we can explain everything by appealing to arrangements
of stars that seem to look like Phoebe’s Face.
17There is empirical evidence that suggests that this is a perceptual capacity—even if it is slightly
informed by culture. Individuals can perceive faces in complex pictures or scenes in a short
enough time frame that there is no time for substantial cognitive influence—that is, they didn’t
think before seeing the faces. See VanRullen and Koch (2003).
18Siegel (2010) argues that it is largely learned—that we can perceive doubt on a person’s face if
we know that person well enough and know when they doubt something. Block (2014) is uncon-
vinced.
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Accordingly, the would-be Phoebe’s Face dispenser would construct vari-
ants of all astronomy theories without appealing to Phoebe’s Face. Among the
empirical consequences of a variant P − would be the following:
(p−) Those particular stars arranged face-wise are visible in August.
In (p−), the particular stars referenced are those that “make up” Phoebe’s
Face. P − shows that Phoebe’s Face is dispensable to P . We do not need to
appeal to a face in order to explain all of what P explains, since P − can explain
everything just as well.
If Phoebe’s Face is dispensable to P in the way just described, then accord-
ing to the standard account of dispensability, P − is empirically equivalent to P .
And that would signify that (p) and (p−) are the same empirical consequence.
However, per TRI, (p) and (p−) are not the same empirical consequence.
This is because Thick discriminates between different mereological pic-
tures. And as we know, humans perceive faces as faces. Because of this, the
representational contents of a face and of Xs arranged face-wise are distinct. We
do not represent something as a face-like arrangement, but as a face. Since
the representational contents of (p) present something as a face, and the rep-
resentational contents of (p−) present some things as looking like a face, these
representational contents are distinct. Compare this to the case of an iron bar
and simples arranged iron bar-wise. Thick entails that these two are distinct:
the representational contents when perceiving an iron bar, if Thick is true,
present the thing perceived as an iron bar. The representational contents when
perceiving just simples arranged iron bar-wise, on Thick, do not present the
things perceived as an iron bar. It is the same here as with Phoebe’s Face. So,
the same considerations that allow TRI to vindicate Fine Grained show that (p)
and (p−) are distinct empirical consequences.
However, this is a problem. Phoebe’s Face is dispensable, and we can show
this by offering P −. And yet TRI, because it entails that the empirical conse-
quences of a Phoebe’s Face-free astronomy theory are trivially distinct from the
ordinary theory, tells us that Phoebe’s Face is not dispensable. So, TRI ought
to be rejected. Once again, the problem is not merely that P seems empirically
equivalent to P −. Rather, the problem is that TRI entails the impossibility of
dispensing with mereologically-rich entities that appear in our empirical con-
sequences. If there is a mereologically-rich entity that is doing no genuine ex-
planatory work in our theory, but we can perceptually distinguish that theory
from one that is identical except it lacks the mereologically-rich entity, then
TRI entails that the entity is not dispensable. But by hypothesis the entity is
not doing any genuine explanatory work. Any entity that appears in our theo-
ries that is not genuinely explanatory should be dispensable, but TRI precludes
the possibility of dispensing with some such entities. That is why we reject it.
3.5 Rejecting Trivial Responses
The trivial response to the CODA, as it stands, cannot be defended. For, to do
so, one must provide a theory of the individuation conditions that will entail
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the trivial difference between the empirical consequences of object-free and
ordinary theories. And no good theory of individuation conditions vindicates
Fine Grained. A theory where semantic differences individuate empirical con-
sequences will not do, nor will a theory where thick representational content
differences individuate empirical consequences. These theories fail because
there are simple cases of dispensing that are not possible by fiat.
The thrust of my argument against Hofweber’s response is that there might
be cases where some composed entity that appears in empirical consequences
is dispensable, and any theory of individuation that vindicates Fine Grained
trivially rules these cases out. This is because Fine Grained entails that any two
theories with empirical consequences that have different thick mereological
content cannot be empirically equivalent. Fine Grained, then, precludes the
possibility of dispensing with a composed entity that appears anywhere in a
theory’s empirical consequences, and this seems absurd. Surely there could
be a dispensable composed entity in our empirical consequences. So we must
reject Fine Grained.
We can generalize my objection to other philosophers who adhere to the
position that thick metaphysical content is empirically significant. The mere-
ological version of this position presupposes that empirical consequences can
be individuated along mereological lines. But if it is in principle possible to
dispense with some mereologically-rich entity in our empirical consequences,
e.g., Phoebe’s Face, then it is false that empirical consequences can be indi-
viduated along mereological lines. Mutatis mutandis for other versions of this
position: A different version presupposes that empirical consequences can be
adjudicated along some particular metaphysical line. But if it is in princi-
ple possible to dispense with some metaphysically-rich entity in our empirical
consequences, then it is false that empirical consequences can be individuated
along such metaphysical lines. I have not yet given counterexamples for non-
mereological versions of Fine Grained, but it is intuitive that for any variety of
this position, there will be an analogue to Phoebe’s Face. All we need is a possi-
ble scenario where we have mistakenly inferred that some thick metaphysical
content in an empirical consequence is significant and where our theories are
just as good when we rid our theories of that metaphysical content.
We should reject Hofweber’s trivial response to the CODA because there is
no good theory of empirical consequences’ individuation conditions that could
serve to show that ordinary and composite-free theories are trivially empiri-
cally inequivalent. We can also give similar arguments for any other variety
of the position that thick metaphysical content is empirically significant. Ac-
cordingly, I have made a case for evidential quietism: our empirical evidence
is radically silent on distinctively metaphysical disputes.
4 UPSHOTS FOR FULL EQUIVALENCE
Let us consider in more detail the position that thick content is scientifically
significant. I argued that thick content is not empirically significant. Here I
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make a tentative case that thick content is sometimes not scientifically signifi-
cant at all.
In the literature on theoretical equivalence, which examines the conditions
under which two theories are fully equivalent, there are philosophers who en-
dorse a position similar to Hofweber’s. These philosophers seem to presuppose
that thick metaphysical content, as it appears in non-empirical consequences,
is scientifically significant. There are cases where the only relevant difference
between two theories is a difference of thick content, and philosophers claim
that such a difference suffices for those two theories being inequivalent. Here
I will present one recent instance and suggest that we should be careful about
concluding that some thick metaphysical difference is scientifically significant.
Usually, philosophers in the full equivalence literature use equivalence as
a means to understanding the significant content of a scientific theory (Barrett
(2019, 1186 - 1192), Weatherall (2019b, §5)). The idea seems to be that when
we have a good understanding of when two theories are equivalent, we can
better gauge which parts of those theories should be taken literally from a sci-
entific realist perspective. Here, I approach from the reverse end. I am arguing
that we can learn some things about equivalence by examining which parts of
our theories are representationally significant. We already have some reason to
think that thick content is not empirically significant, and I aim to show that
in some cases, thick content is not at all significant. Moreover, recall above
that I examined whether thick content was empirically significant by using an
alternative notion, dispensability, as a proxy. For full equivalence, there is no
analogous proxy to judge whether some content is significant. Accordingly, the
conclusions reached here are more tentative than the preceding, but I hope to
show that there is headway to be made by approaching full equivalence from
this angle.
Consider Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics.
It is commonly held among physicists and philosophers of physics that these
two formulations are equivalent: the two theories say the same thing about
the world and are mere notational variants. Recently, North (2009, 2021a) has
pushed back against this received view. She argues that there are differences
between the structures of these two theories that are significant in the sense
that they show that the theories are in fact inequivalent. This argument has
generated much discussion, and has led many philosophers to discuss the con-
ditions under which two theories are equivalent in general.
Let me simplify the debate. Briefly, in Hamiltonian mechanics, the state of
a classical physical system is specified by the particles’ positions and momen-
tum, whereas in Lagrangian mechanics, the state of a classical physical system
is specified by the particles’ positions and velocity. Lagrangian state-spaces
have metric structure, whereas Hamiltonian have merely symplectic structure.
This difference in structure, North argues, calls into question the equivalence
between the two formulations. North claims that because these two theories
do not have a structure-preserving mapping between them—the structure of
one is literally not present in the other—they are not equivalent.
North claims that this structural difference is significant; it is enough to
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show that these theories say different things about the world from the scien-
tific perspective. North’s argument that this apparent structural difference is
sufficient for inequivalence requires an answer to the following question about
equivalence in general: in virtue of what can difference in structure be suf-
ficient for inequivalence? Or, as she says, “The question is whether they are
equivalent, full stop. The answer depends on whether what differences there
are matter in any way” (North, 2021a). We need some measure for when an
apparent difference in structure is significant. Surely there are cases where
structural differences are sufficient for inequivalence; for example, one differ-
ence between Newtonian and Galilean spacetime is the structure of absolute
rest, and this difference seems significant. On the other hand, the same theory
formulated in two different natural languages, say French and English, leads
to two theories that have some structural difference, though we think that this
is a case of mere notational variance. As a result, we need some answers to
what kinds (or degrees) of structural differences are significant. Regarding the
question of whether what differences there are matter, North might answer
that even thick structural differences matter.
The difference between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics seems to
be a merely thick structural difference. One formulation presents an under-
lying structure that is distinct from the other’s; that one theory says a system
is specified by momentum and the other velocity is strictly speaking a dif-
ferent underlying structural picture. The structural difference between these
two theories is merely in their thick structural content. This is because, in
most normal cases, a metric structure can be “recovered” within Hamilto-
nian mechanics. (More precisely, there is a mapping from any hyperregular
model of Lagrangian mechanics to a model of Hamiltonian, and vice versa.
Cf. Barrett (2019).) If so, then while North is correct that there is not a
structure-preserving mapping between the two theories, the difference be-
tween the structures of the two formulations is merely in the thick structural
content. Hamiltonian mechanics is not committed to metric structure as such,
but the role that metric structure plays within Lagrangian mechanics can be
recovered within Hamiltonian.
The present interpretation of North’s argument is that she is pointing to
a thick structural difference between the two formulations and presupposing
that even thick structural differences are enough for inequivalence. (North
might want to push back against this interpretation, but a natural reading of
her argument presents such an interpretation.) I will suggest that this an-
swer to the above question, that even thick structural differences matter, leads
to problems similarly to how Hofweber’s presupposition that thick content is
empirically significant leads to problems. Consequently, North must offer a
precise account of when differences in structure entail inequivalence; other-
wise, her objection to the standard view cannot stand.
Let us consider a case of theories which have a difference in merely thick
structural content but intuitively this difference is not significant. If there is
such a case, then merely thick structural differences are not sufficient for in-
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equivalence. Consider the theory of linear orders.19 We can formulate the
theory using the concept of a nonstrict order less than or equal to, signified the
binary predicate ≤, or we can formulate it using the concept of a strict order
less than, signified by the binary predicate <. These formulations have different
axioms; for instance, the first has the axiom that everything bears ≤ to itself,
whereas the latter has the axiom that nothing bears < to itself. There is a differ-
ence in thick structure between these two formulations. The first avails itself
of the property is less than or equal to, whereas the latter avails itself to the
property is less than. The second, strictly speaking, does not appeal to less than
or equal to as such. This is a thick structural difference. Moreover, there is no
structure-preserving mapping between them since they trivially and explicitly
have different structures.
However, there’s an obvious sense in which these are equivalent formula-
tions of linear orders. They both ascribe, in some sense, the same structure
to sets. We take it that the difference between formulating linear orders with
either ≤ or < is not a significant difference; it does not make a difference to the
content of the theory. This is a mere thick structural difference that we ought
not interpret as scientifically significant. We noted in §3 that there are many
cases where thick differences are not scientifically significant; in particular, we
cannot appeal to thick differences to conclude that two theories are empirically
inequivalent. Likewise, here we cannot point to the thick difference between
these two formulations of linear orders as significant; just because there is a
difference in the thick structural content, we cannot infer that the two formu-
lations are inequivalent. I take it that one can consult their intuitions to tell
that the difference between less than and less than or equal to does not matter in
the scientific sense. Moreover, we can easily recover the structure of ≤ on the
theory that only has < and vice versa.
Here we have a case where, intuitively, thick structural differences are sci-
entifically insignificant. Some thick structural differences do not themselves
entail that two theories are theoretically inequivalent. If so, then North’s claim
that the structures of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are sufficient for
their inequivalence cannot hinge only on there being a thick structural differ-
ence between the two.
This argument is not meant to be conclusive.20 If one truly wishes to dis-
19Cf. Winnie (1986), Barrett (2020, 1187).
20The present paper had been finished by the time North published her most recent book, North
(2021b). Much of what has been said in this section would have changed in light of her Chapter
7 of that book. In particular, North has provided a more general explanation of what is happen-
ing between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics. In that chapter, North considers a theory’s
“picture of the world”, which corresponds directly with what I call a theory’s thick content. She
identifies multiple pairs of theories that she takes to be informationally equivalent but metaphys-
ically inequivalent; these theories disagree on “what there is, what it is like, and how and why it
behaves in certain ways to give rise to what we observe” (North, 2021b, 196). She clarifies that the
difference between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics is a difference between the metaphys-
ical pictures they present (North (2021b, 224)). North suggests that metaphysical inequivalence is
sufficient for theoretical inequivalence. In this we agree, though—as has become clear throughout
this paper—it is not always clear when two theories are metaphysically inequivalent. For we need
some measure of when two theories make different metaphysical claims about the world. It seems
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tinguish between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics on the basis of thick
structural differences, then they may simply accept that these two formulations
of linear orders are inequivalent and that even thick structural differences mat-
ter. My argument is meant to show simply that North’s presupposition about
the significance of structural differences, though seemingly innocuous, leads
to unpalatable consequences. It seems unintuitive to count all thick structural
content as significant, since it leads us to conclude that many theories which
we take (or should take) to be equivalent are trivially inequivalent. Here is
the lesson we should learn: North claims that there is a significant difference
between Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics which entails that the two
formulations are inequivalent. One way to articulate the difference between
Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics is a difference in thick structural con-
tent, in the underlying structural picture associated with each formulation.
The latter appeals to metric structure and the former merely symplectic struc-
ture. Yet thick structural differences between two theories seem not to be suf-
ficient for inequivalence. We have already seen that two theories which differ
only in thick content might still be empirically equivalent. Likewise, we should
think that two theories which differ only in thick content might still be fully
equivalent. Moreover, we have good reason to think that there are theories
which differ in their thick structural content but are fully equivalent. In or-
der to conclude that Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics are inequivalent,
North must provide a difference-maker between the two that is more than a
mere thick structural difference.
5 CONCLUSION
What I have shown is this: First, that many philosophers adhere to some thesis
that thick metaphysical content is empirically significant, and that any variety
of this thesis requires an indefensible presupposition about the individuation
conditions of our empirical consequences. Second, that the trivial response
to the CODA is not tenable. It is not permissible to infer empirical inequiva-
lence from differences in the underlying metaphysical pictures of two theories.
Third, that these arguments have some purchase in the theoretical equivalence
literature. We should be suspicious of philosophers who argue for inequiv-
alence solely on the basis of differences among thick metaphysical content.
There is much more work to be done on determining when the consequences
of theories are the same or different, and I have shown that there are implica-
tions across philosophy of science and metaphysics for these determinations.
to me that the example about linear orders is not a case of metaphysically inequivalent theories,
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and G.˜Székely, editors, Forthcoming in Hajnal Andreka and Istvan Nemeti on
Unity of Science.
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
Winnie, J. (1986). Invariants and Objectivity: A Theory with Applications To
Relativity and Geometry. In Colodny, R. G., editor, From Quarks to Quasars,
pages 71–180. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
Worrall, J. (2011). Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence.
Synthese, 180(2):157–172.
25
